Federalism and Liberalism: A German Perspective
By Ronald Meinardus
The ongoing political debate in the Philippines regarding the
change of the constitution focuses on procedural matters and the
aspired form of government. While proponents of the revision argue
that the presidential system is potentially a hazard for the political
stability of the Republic, more cynical observers suppose the
whole cha-cha-move is just a ploy of an individual politician
aspiring for power as a prime minister elected not by a popular
but a parliamentary vote. Whatever way one sees this, the ongoing
debate is - as one columnist of this paper wrote a few days ago
– proof “that the present structure is not working”.
From a structural point of view, more important than the choice
between the presidential and the parliamentary forms of government
I find the degree of political centralization, or put differently:
the extent to which the central authority has devolved political
and other powers to the local and regional levels.
Regarding local autonomy, the Philippines has moved a good way
ahead in political devolution. While the implementation of the
Local Government Code may – as one hears – have not been as successful
as originally aspired, the legal framework of Philippine local
autonomy has become a benchmark far beyond the shores of this
land. I remember organizing seminars and workshops on local autonomy
in South Korea some years ago; my Korean partners were keen to
invite Philippine resource persons and learn from them how local
autonomy was promoted in this part of the world.
This instance shows that also regarding the sensitive issue of
domestic political and constitutional debates it is not uncommon
to look beyond ones’ own borders and learn how other societies
have tackled – and in many cases solved – similar issues. Interestingly,
in the ongoing constitutional debates in the Philippines my own
country Germany has become an important point of reference. I
can think of more than one reason for this. Without wanting to
sound too patriotic, Germany does indeed posses a fine constitution
that has guaranteed political stability and democratic rule in
that country ever since its inception after the catastrophe of
World War II in 1949. But, then, many other European (and non-European)
countries have an even longer history of stable democratic rule
based on a well-devised constitution. Therefore, I would suggest
that the impact the “Grundgesetz” – or German fundamental law
- has had on the constitutional debates in the Philippines is
mainly due to the role played by the German political foundations
in this country. These institutes are involved mainly in the filed
of civic education aimed at promoting democracy and the rule of
law. On several occasions, they have confronted their Filipino
partners with the constitutional traditions and practices in the
heart of Europe. As we can now see, these intellectual exercises
have not been without impact.
Central to the German constitution is the notion of political
decentralization and, therefore, federalism. In the following,
let’s take a closer look at what this means in practice, before
tracing the fundamental ideological roots of federalism.
“The Federal Republic of Germany shall be a democratic and social
federal state.” This is one of the key paragraphs of the German
constitution, as it establishes the principles the state is based
on. The writers of the constitution deemed federalism so important
that they included this provision among the few elements that
are not amendable under any circumstances. Federalism has long
become a part of the Germans’ political culture. Often, we refer
to our country simply as “die Bundesrepublik” – the Federal Republic.
This shows how central the concept of political decentralization
has become for us.
In Germany, the 16 federal states have substantial authority.
The citizens of the states do not only elect their own state parliaments,
who then choose their own state governments headed by veritable
prime ministers. Importantly, these politicians wield genuine
political power. They are responsible for all affairs pertaining
to culture, internal security, the media, local government and
regional taxation. In addition, the “Laender” have a significant
say in national affairs.
Like the Philippines, Germany has a bicameral legislature. But
unlike here, the members of the Upper House are not elected on
a national level. The Federal Council, as it is called, is more
like the Senate in the United State, representing specific regions,
in our case, the regional governments. In the legislative practice,
a majority in the “Bundesrat” has the right to block all laws
that directly or indirectly affect the interests of the regions.
According to estimates, more than fifty percent of federal legislation
is conditional on approval by the regional entities.
“Federalism” denotes a form of decentralized government, where
– in legal terms - the component parts of the federation (be they
states, provinces, laender or cantons) possess statehood of their
own that in some cases have existed prior to formation of the
federation. There are other cases, were a federal state was created
by the devolution of power from a previously centralized government.
The underlying principle on which every federal constitution rests
is the principle of subsidiarity. This stipulates that decision
making power should rest as close as possible to those it affects.
This is obviously a fundamental liberal principle which reaches
far beyond the constitutional structure of the state. Freedom
is the supreme principle of liberalism, which is just another
term for self-determination or autonomy. If liberals speak of
freedom, they first and foremost think of the freedom or the autonomy
of the individual. Accordingly, liberals believe that the right
to make decisions should first and foremost rest with the individual.
In a political or collective context, this is not always possible
for practical reasons. For instance, we cannot decide individually
on which side of the road we would like to drive our cars. Still,
the autonomy of a small group leaves more freedom with its members
than that of a large group as fewer fellow-members engage in the
decision-making process. From a liberal standpoint, therefore,
wherever collective decision-making is unavoidable, this should
be exercised in the smallest possible unit. Consequently, any
delegation of power from smaller to larger units should be subjected
to the burden of proof that the smaller unit is unable to cope
with the problem in question. In practice, this means that all
those matters should be left in private hands or in the hands
of the citizenry for which a need of government interference has
not explicitly been proven. This is the essence of the principle
of subsidiarity, which is not only a core principle of liberalism
but also the essence of the concept of civil society. Applied
to the organization of the state, subsidiarity will result in
a decentralized form of government where only those matters are
dealt with at a central level that cannot be dealt with adequately
at lover levels.
One major merit of federalism lies in its capacity to accommodate
diversity. When a country is subdivided in sufficiently small
and autonomous subunits, different religious, ethnic or cultural
groups can arrange their affairs according to their own preferences
in their areas. This is the case where the boundaries of the sub-units
coincide more or less with the religious, ethnic or cultural division
lines permitting each group to have at least one of those units
"as its own". Even where such groups or groupings neither
exist nor play a significant role, a federal structure makes it
easier to take into account regional peculiarities, as the local
or regional government or administration can address such peculiarities.
Generally, where there exist many decision-making centers covering
limited areas, more people will get what they want from those
who govern them than where only one decision-making body is in
charge for the whole country. In the latter case, you may reach
a situation, where 51 percent of the population could dictate
to 49 percent. In short: When administrative borders coincide,
by and large, with ethnic or other division lines within a country,
federalism can be a highly effective method of solving minority
problems.
By securing room for a wide variety of solutions – or attempts
at solution - federalism promotes “competition as a method of
discovery” (F.A.v.Hayek). The direct opposite of a "one-solution-fits-all"
approach, federalism tends to minimize the risks involved in errors
of political decision-making: if such an error affects the whole
country, the damage will be considerably severer than if it affects
only one province. Worse, still: if the system allows for only
one approach (i.e. the one covering the whole country), the probability
of identifying the most conducive policy is much smaller than
if different policies are applied in the various sub-units of
the country. It is an age-old and empirically well-supported experience
that competition produces incentives for individuals and collectives
to strive for better results. This basic experience is also valid
for the organization of the state. While centralist states lack
this dimension, federalism may provide for such competition among
the sub-division.
Basically, it is all about sharing political power and control.
Sharing and checking political power is the very essence of democracy
- the better the system of checks and balances in a country, the
better the quality of its democracy. In a democracy, division
of power should not be confined to the classical separation between
the three traditional powers – legislative, executive and judiciary.
In addition to this horizontal division, what may be termed a
vertical division of power is crucial. To check the power of the
central government, it is essential to devolve authority and rights
to lower levels.
As consequence of this vertical separation of powers, federalism
foresees a clearly defined allocation of responsibility at the
various levels of government. In other words, each state level
should hold clearly defined powers and responsibilities exclusive
to it. There should be no mixing or "sharing" of power
among different levels of government as this would only result
in a blurring of responsibilities. The voters should always be
in the position to identify the origin of a policy. They should
know, for example, who to blame or who to credit for the quality
of public services or the level of taxation in a given case. Without
such transparency, a rational decision at elections becomes difficult.
This transparency is a precondition for democratic accountability.
Last but not least, for responsibility and accountability to be
genuine, the transfer of political powers must be accompanied
by a transfer of fiscal powers. Devolving power to decentralized
units makes sense only if the necessary taxation powers go with
it. As long as the central government controls the financial strings,
all "devolution" or “decentralization" is but sham
devolution and sham decentralization. He who pays the piper calls
the tune – this is as much a truism in politics as anywhere else.
Business World Internet Edition: June 21, 2003
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Dr. Ronald Meinardus was the former Resident Representative
of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in the Philippines and will
leave Manila late September for a new posting in the Middle East.
He writes a blog at www.myliberaltimes.com