Military, Politics and Constitutional Order

By Ronald Meinardus

Manila _ Military intervention in Philippine politics is not a novel phenomenon. The politicization of the armed forces occurred during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, when the influence and power of officers were determined not by merit or performance but political allegiance to factions or cliques. Ever since, the military has played the role of political arbiter in crucial moments of Philippine history. The armed forces gave its blessing to the transfer of power from Marcos to Corazon Aquino in 1986 following what is often referred to as the People Power Revolution. In early 2001, the decision of the military leadership to withdraw support from disgraced President Joseph Estrada paved the way to power for the incumbent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

In an international comparison of troop-strength and military hardware, the Philippines’ 113,000-strong armed forces may be termed relatively weak. But, in this case, an observation by Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington applies: ``What drives the soldier into the political arena is not his own strength but rather the weakness of the political system.’’ When political institutions cease to provide the mechanism for the resolution of political, economic and social issues, extra-constitutional routes to achieve political goals become an attractive alternative.

Structurally, fragile institutions and military intervention in politics are two sides of a coin. Lamenting what he terms ``our reliance on extra-constitutional means of effecting change,’’ the well-known Filipino columnist and sociologist Randy David states, ``with a history of martial law, three people power explosions, and seven coup attempts in a period of 30 years, it will not be easy for Filipinos to go back to a naive faith in constitutional order.’’ These sentences were written before last weekend’s mutiny in the heart of the Philippines’ financial district, when once more the absence of total authority of the political leadership invited disgruntled elements of the military to act in open rebellion. Lack of faith in the constitutional order was certainly the main-driving force of the mutineers. It may be fortunate for that same disrespected constitutional order that not only this most recent but all earlier armed rebellions have ended in failure. Compared with other coup-prone nations, the Philippines has a ``comparative advantage,’’ which may be explained by factionalism and lack of unity in the military ranks. This fragmentation became apparent also during the recent rebellion, which was staged by a small clique consisting of no more than 300 men and junior officers.

All this is not to say that the government has not taken the matter seriously. The actual mutiny followed days of coup-rumors, which filled the pages of newspapers and led to a myriad of consultations between the government and military personnel. Only a few days before the revolt, the president herself engaged in dialogue with the conspirators discussing with them their well-known gripes such as low pay, insufficient housing and corruption in the top-echelons of the military. These grievances from the ranks are nothing new, and the government has on more than one occasion promised to address these concerns. New and disturbing, on the other hand, is the plotters’ accusation that the government is selling ammunitions to various armed insurgent groups faced by the military. ``Our own bullets are killing our brother soldiers,’’ Antonio Trillanes, a navy lieutenant who led the rebels, said. The plotters even accused the government of staging recent bombings in Mindanao and pinning the blame on the Muslim separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

The mutiny in Manila could not have come at a worse time for the government. On the international front, the president and her team have yet to recover from the embarrassment of the recent jailbreak by an Indonesian terrorist. At the same time, the government is preparing for the resumption of peace talks with the MILF, slated to begin in Malaysia soon. While foreign governments friendly to the Arroyo administration rushed to express their outright support, according to foreign diplomats in Manila the mutiny undermines the international confidence in the political stability of the country. There are reasons to believe that communicating this message to the world _ inside and outside the national boundaries _ was the core objective of the mutineers in uniform and their civilian masterminds. There are indications that the rebellious soldiers did not act on their own. The government has even implicated an incumbent senator as having pulled the strings behind the scenes. A former coup-leader himself, this officer-turned politician has recently announced that he will be a candidate in the presidential elections in May 2004.

Meanwhile, Arroyo has celebrated the end of the mutiny as a "victory for democracy." Obviously, the beleaguered president is trying to make the best out of a difficult situation. Yes, bringing the military revolt in the center of a densely populated district to a peaceful and bloodless end may be called a victory of reason. But for democracy to be victorious, a mechanism that effectively prevents unconstitutional military interventions in all political matters needs to be established.

Dr. Ronald Meinardus was the former Resident Representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in the Philippines and will leave Manila late September for a new posting in the Middle East. He writes a blog at www.myliberaltimes.com